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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE  
 
Nature of the Case 
 
John Kim Baker appeals from his conviction for felony eluding, challenging the 
district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the Information on double jeopardy 
grounds.  The district court erred in denying Mr. Baker’s motion to dismiss because he 
was charged with felony eluding in Ada County after pleading guilty to misdemeanor 
eluding in Elmore County, and both eluding charges were based on a single criminal 
offense.     
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
At approximately 12:03 a.m. on March 31, 2015, Ada County dispatch broadcast 
an attempt to locate a vehicle—specifically, a black Buick—regarding a possible 
aggravated assault that occurred at a hotel in Boise.  (2/25/16 Tr., p.35, Ls.4-8; 3/4/16 
Tr., p.2, L.18 – p.3, L.6.)  Ada County Sheriff’s Deputy Jason Woodcock observed the 
suspect vehicle at Burger King and engaged his overhead lights.  (3/4/16 Tr., p.4, Ls.7-
10.)  The vehicle fled, and Deputy Woodcock pursued it.  (3/4/16 Tr., p.4, Ls.7-20.)  
After traveling through various parking lots, the suspect vehicle proceeded onto I-84, 
followed by multiple Ada County and Boise City units with their lights and sirens on.  
(3/4/16 Tr., p.4, Ls.11-20; p.5, Ls.2-10.)  The pursuit continued, with the suspect vehicle 
traveling between 110 and 120 miles per hour eastbound on I-84.  (3/4/16 Tr., p.5, 
Ls.11-16.)  At some point, Ada County requested that the Elmore County Sheriff’s Office 
deploy spikes near the boundary of Ada County and Elmore County.  (3/4/16 Tr., p.6, 
Ls.11-19.) 
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At approximately 12:19 a.m., the Ada County Supervisor terminated the Ada 
County pursuit after learning the Boise City units had terminated their investigation of 
the aggravated assault.  (2/25/16 Tr., p.67, Ls.4-17; 2/25/16 Tr., p.73, Ls.4-17; 3/4/16 
Tr., p.5, L.17 – p.6, L.6.)  The Ada County officers who were involved in the pursuit 
exited the interstate at the last exit before the county line, while the suspect vehicle 
continued eastward toward Elmore County.  (2/25/16 Tr., p.79, Ls.21-23; 3/4/16 Tr., p.6, 
Ls.7-10.)  The Elmore County Sheriff’s Office did not deploy spikes at this time because 
it learned the Ada County pursuit had been terminated.  (3/4/16 Tr., p.6, Ls.14-19.)  
However, the Elmore County officers were concerned the suspect vehicle might exit the 
interstate and enter Mountain Home.  (3/4/16 Tr., p.6, Ls.20-24.)  Three Elmore County 
units occupied the two Mountain Home exits, exits 90 and 95, with their rear flashing 
emergency lights on.  (2/25/16 Tr., p.87, Ls.1-18; 2/25/16 Tr., p.99, L.24 – p.100, L.16; 
3/4/16 Tr., p.6, L.22 – p.7, L.3.)   
Mr. Baker testified he could see the lights of the police vehicles and “couldn’t get 
off the freeway.”  (2/25/16 Tr., p.14, Ls.4-8; p.16, Ls.2-7.)  He testified he “knew [the 
lights] were for [him]” and so he pulled over to the side of the interstate “and prayed to 
God and called . . . my counselor, my father, [and] my mother [to say] I’m sorry.”  
(2/25/16 Tr., p.7, Ls.5-10; p.18, Ls.10-12.)  Counsel for Mr. Baker asked him whether he 
was trying to avoid the police when he pulled over and he answered, “Absolutely.”  
(2/25/16 Tr., p.25, Ls.12-13.)   
 At approximately 12:56 a.m., the Elmore County officers cleared their posts at 
the Mountain Home exits and resumed their normal activities because they observed 
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the suspect vehicle cut through the median and head back in the westbound lanes 
towards Ada County.1  (2/25/16 Tr., p.101, L.10 – p.102, L.2; PSI, p.55.)   
At approximately 2:30 a.m., Elmore County dispatch advised the driver of the 
suspect vehicle, now identified as Mr. Baker, was making phone calls from somewhere 
between Mountain Home and Boise stating he would provoke officers to shoot him.  
(3/4/16 Tr., p.7, L.19 – p.8, L.1.)  Sergeant Burnett proceeded westbound on I-84, and 
observed the suspect vehicle sitting stationary in the shoulder of the eastbound lanes.  
(3/4/16 Tr., p.8, Ls.2-13.)  Sergeant Burnett made a U-turn with his flashing emergency 
lights on, and pulled up behind the suspect vehicle.  (32/25/16 Tr., p.103; Ls.5-16; /4/16 
Tr., p.8, Ls.14-16.)  The vehicle fled eastbound on I-84, traveling roughly 35-40 miles 
per hour, which is well below the posted speed limit.  (3/4/16 Tr., p.8, L.21 – p.9, L.5.)  
Another officer deployed spike strips and Mr. Baker drove over those spike strips, 
disabling his vehicle.  (3/4/16 Tr., p.9, Ls.7-10.)   
Mr. Baker was arrested and charged In Elmore County, Case No. 2015-833, with 
misdemeanor eluding in violation of Idaho Code § 49-1401.  (PSI, p.382; 3/4/16 Tr., p.9, 
Ls.11-13.)  He pled guilty and was sentenced to 60 days in jail.  (PSI, p.382; 2/25/16 
Tr., p.3, L.25 – p.4, L.8; 3/4/16 Tr., p.10, Ls.2-6.)  Over two months later, on June 3, 
2015, Mr. Baker was charged in Ada County with felony eluding in violation of Idaho 
Code § 49-1404 based on his driving behavior on March 31, 2015.  (R., pp.7-9.)  The 
State subsequently filed an Information charging Mr. Baker with felony eluding.  
                                            
1 The district court found none of the Elmore County officers saw the suspect vehicle.  
(3/4/16 Tr., p.7, Ls.1-12.)  The police reports and the testimony at the suppression 
hearing indicate the officers thought they observed the suspect vehicle cut through the 
median and head back in the westbound lanes towards Ada County.  (2/25/16 
Tr., p.101, L.10 – p.102, L.2; PSI, p.55.)   
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(R., pp.49-50.)  Mr. Baker filed a motion to dismiss the Information on the grounds that it 
violated the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy clause because he pled guilty to eluding 
in Elmore County for the same conduct.  (R., pp.79-86.)  The district court held a 
hearing on Mr. Baker’s motion.  Following the hearing, Mr. Baker and the State 
submitted written closing arguments.  (R., pp.93-98, 99-103.) 
Counsel for Mr. Baker argued Mr. Baker’s actions “were part of one continuing 
event” because “[h]is intent and objective was to elude police for the entire three hour 
time frame” and “[s]imply because police stopped chasing him for a time does not mean 
he is now guilty of two separate and distinct crimes.”  (R., p.94.)  The State argued 
Mr. Baker committed two crimes of eluding, the first ending at 12:19 a.m. when Ada 
County units terminated their pursuit, and the second beginning at 2:45 a.m. in Elmore 
County.  (R., pp.100-01.)  The district court denied Mr. Baker’s motion to dismiss, 
concluding there were two separate and distinct acts of eluding, and the two charges 
thus did not violate the double jeopardy clause.  (3/4/16 Tr., pp.12-15; R., p.104.)   
Mr. Baker then pled guilty to felony eluding and being a persistent violator, 
reserving his right to appeal from the denial of his motion to dismiss.  (R., pp.104, 110.)  
The district court accepted Mr. Baker’s guilty plea and sentenced him to a unified term 
of ten years, with two years fixed, to be served concurrent with all other sentences.  
(3/4/16 Tr., p.40, L.17 – p.42, L.5; 4/27/16 Tr., p.57, Ls.10-14; R., p.116.)  The judgment 
of conviction and commitment was filed on May 2, 2016, and Mr. Baker filed a timely 
notice of appeal on May 9, 2016.  (R, pp.116-19, 121-23.)      
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Baker’s motion to dismiss? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Baker’s Motion To Dismiss 
 
A. Introduction 
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that no 
person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.  This clause affords a 
defendant three basic protections—against a second prosecution for the same offense 
after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and multiple 
criminal punishments for the same offense.  See Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229 
(1994); State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 370 (Ct. App. 2011).  The State’s prosecution 
of Mr. Baker in this case violated the third of these protections because it subjected 
Mr. Baker to two criminal punishments for a single criminal offense.  The acts Mr. Baker 
committed on March 31, 2015, when he eluded police officers in Ada County and 
Elmore County over the course of three hours, were not two separate events, but a 
single continuing offense.  The fact that Mr. Baker was twice charged with, twice 
prosecuted for, and twice punished for this single offense violates the constitutional 
protection against double jeopardy.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
Whether a defendant's prosecution complies with the constitutional protection 
against double jeopardy is a question of law over which we exercise free review.  
State v. Moffat, 154 Idaho 529, 530 (Ct. App. 2013).   
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C. Mr. Baker Was Subjected To Two Criminal Punishments For The Same Offense, 
Violating The Constitutional Protection Against Double Jeopardy  
 
Double jeopardy may be implicated where a defendant is charged under the 
same statute for multiple acts arising out of the same criminal episode.  See Moffat, 154 
Idaho at 531, 533 (rejecting State’s attempt to separate defendant’s single crime into “a 
series of temporal or spatial units to avoid double jeopardy limitations”).  The United 
States Supreme Court stated in Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977), that the “[t]he 
Double Jeopardy Clause is not such a fragile guarantee that prosecutors can avoid its 
limitations by the simple expedient of dividing a single crime into a series of temporal or 
spatial units.”  Id. at 169. 
Where a defendant is charged with multiple acts under the same statute, “the 
court must first make a factual inquiry as to whether the defendant’s acts were part of a 
single continuing offense or whether the acts each constitute separate, distinct, and 
independent crimes.”  State v. Sellers, No. 42716, 2016 WL 4548086, at *7 (Idaho 
Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).  “Determining whether 
criminal acts are separate or part of a single continuing offense requires consideration 
of the circumstances of the conduct as well as the intent and objective of the actor.”  Id. 
(quotation marks and citation omitted); see also State v. Major, 111 Idaho 410, 414, 725 
P.2d 115, 119 (1986) (same). 
Mr. Baker was charged with two acts of eluding—one a misdemeanor, and one a 
felony.  Under Idaho law, a driver of a motor vehicle is guilty of misdemeanor eluding if 
he “wilfully flees or attempts to elude a pursuing police vehicle when given a visual or 
audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop.”  Idaho Code § 49-1404(1).  A driver is 
guilty of felony eluding when, among other things, he “[t]ravels in excess of thirty (30) 
 8 
miles per above the posted speed limit” or “[d]rives . . . in a manner as to endanger or 
likely to endanger the property of another or the person of another.”  Idaho Code § 49-
1404(2)(a), (c).   
The district court concluded the misdemeanor eluding charged in Elmore County 
and the felony eluding charged in Ada County were not part of a single continuing 
offense because “[t]here is a significant difference in time; there’s a significant 
difference in location; and there’s a significant difference in the nature of the activity.”  
(3/4/16 Tr., p.15, Ls.3-6.)  In reaching this decision, the district court considered only the 
circumstances of Mr. Baker’s conduct, and did not consider Mr. Baker’s intent and 
objective.  This was an error.  Had the district court properly considered both factors, it 
would have concluded the two eluding charges were part of a single, continuing offense, 
and that Mr. Baker could not be prosecuted for both without violating the constitutional 
protection against double jeopardy.      
At the hearing on Mr. Baker’s motion to dismiss, the district court asked 
Mr. Baker whether his perception was that it was “all one continuous event” and he 
answered, “Absolutely.”  (2/25/16 Tr., p.32, Ls.2-8.)  Mr. Baker testified he saw the Ada 
County officers “turn[ ] off their lights for a little while” and “then [he] [saw] more lights up 
there” and “couldn’t get off the freeway.”  (2/25/16 Tr., p.14, Ls.1-8.)  He testified he 
“knew [the lights] were for [him]” and so he pulled over to the side of the interstate “and 
prayed to God and called . . . my counselor, my father, [and] my mother [to say] I’m 
sorry.”  (2/25/16 Tr., p.7, Ls.5-10; p.18, Ls.10-12.)  The following exchange took place 
between the prosecutor and Mr. Baker on cross examination: 
Q: Okay.  So up ahead of you, you see some lights?  You don’t know 
that they’re up for you, you just see cop lights? 
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A: I see them, and I knew they were for me.  With all due respect, sir, I 
knew they were for me because they just got done chasing me from 
behind, and then I entered Elmore County or whatever it was, and . 
. . the lights stopped off. 
And I went forward to try to get off at the exit, and I [saw] more 
lights so I couldn’t go any further, and so I pulled over. 
 
(2/25/16 Tr., p.19, Ls.4-14.)  The following exchange took place between Mr. Baker and 
his counsel on redirect: 
Q: The prosecuting attorney asked you about when you were pulled 
over on the side of the road. 
 
A: Yeah. 
 
Q: You said you pulled over because you saw lights ahead. 
 
A: Uh-huh. 
 
Q: Why didn’t you just go and— 
 
A: Because I didn’t want to—I was panicked, and I didn’t want to get 
arrested right then. 
 
Q: So you were trying to avoid police by pulling over? 
 
A: Well, yeah.  I knew it was done.  I just needed more time. 
 
(2/25/16 Tr., p.24, Ls.7-19.)  Mr. Baker’s counsel later asked Mr. Baker whether he was 
trying to avoid the police when he pulled over and he answered, “Absolutely.”  (2/25/16 
Tr., p.25, Ls.12-13.)  It is clear from Mr. Baker’s testimony that his intent and objective in 
pulling over to the side of the interstate was to elude the police, which is the same 
objective he had when failing to stop in Ada County, and later in fleeing from a pursuing 
police car in Elmore County.   
This conclusion is supported by the circumstances of Mr. Baker’s conduct.  The 
gist of Mr. Baker’s conduct here was his unlawful attempt to avoid being stopped by the 
police.  The fundamental act he was charged with having committed in both cases was 
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the act of trying to get away from the police.  To be sure, he did so on multiple 
occasions—first, by driving faster than the speed limit in Ada County to avoid officers 
pursing him; second, by pulling over, at night, on the side of the interstate in Elmore 
County, to avoid officers ahead of him; and third, by driving slower than the speed limit 
in Elmore County to avoid officers pursing him.  While these actions can be separated, 
they add up to a single uninterrupted and unbroken offense of eluding.  The way in 
which Mr. Baker eluded changed over the course of three hours, but the entirety of what 
was occurring was a single attempt by Mr. Baker to avoid the police.  From Mr. Baker’s 
perspective, there was no period of time in which the police were not seeking to 
apprehend him and no period of time in which he ceased trying to avoid apprehension.   
The fact that Mr. Baker’s entire offense took almost three hours and involved 
different types of driving behavior does not compel the conclusion that he committed 
multiple offenses.  In Brown v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held the Ohio Court of Appeals 
correctly concluded that joyriding and auto theft are the same offense for double 
jeopardy purposes, but erred in concluding the defendant could be convicted of both 
crimes merely because the charges against him “focused on different parts of his 9-day 
joyride.”  432 U.S. at 169.  If a single crime can continue for nine days, then surely it can 
continue for three hours.  The critical factor here is that Mr. Baker’s acts were set on 
foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force.  See United States v. 
Midstate Horticultural Co., 306 U.S. 161, 166 (1939) (stating a continuing offense is “a 
continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated 
by an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy”).   
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The fact that Mr. Baker engaged in different types of driving behavior is also of 
little significance.  The district court found it mattered a great deal, explaining:  “In Ada 
County, the defendant was . . . eluding the officers at speeds on the interstate of 110 to 
120 miles per hour.  And in Elmore County the defendant eluded the officer by failing to 
stop while given the requisite signals to stop but only traveling between . . . 30 and 45 
miles per hour; completely different sorts of events.”  (3/4/16 Tr., p.15, Ls.7-13.)  Surely 
the fact that Mr. Baker was eluding officers by driving first above the speed limit, and 
then below the speed limit, is not a significant factor in determining whether he 
committed a single offense or multiple offenses.   
Looking at the circumstances of Mr. Baker’s conduct as well as his intent and 
objective, the district court should have concluded the criminal acts Mr. Baker 
committed in Ada County and Elmore County on March 31, 2015, were part of a single 
continuing offense.  It was up to Ada County and Elmore County to determine who 
should prosecute Mr. Baker, but it violated the constitutional protection against double 
jeopardy for Mr. Baker to be subjected to multiple punishments based on his single 
offense of eluding.   
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CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons stated above, Mr. Baker respectfully requests that the district 
court vacate his judgment of conviction, reverse the district court’s order denying his 
motion to dismiss, and remand this case to the district court with instructions to dismiss 
the Information.   
 DATED this 24th day of October, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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